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IN THE

SUPRE~lli

COURT OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.

KENNETH SHARP, GEORGE
CHRISTENSEN, and JAMES
N. TUCKER,

16147, 16040,
and 16019

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants

Sharp and Christensen were charged by

complaint and information with theft of a motor vehicle, a
violation of Utah Code Annotated

§

76-6-404

(1953), as amended,

and with aiding the escape of a person from official custody,
a violation of Utah Code Annotated

§

76-8-310

(1953) as amended.

Appellant Tucker was also charged with theft of a
motor vehicle and with the crime of escape from official
custody, a violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-309

(1953),

as amended.
Appellants Sharp and Christensen appeal both

of
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their convictions.

Appellant Tucker appeals his conviction

for theft but does not challenge his conviction of escape
from official custody.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following a trial by jury before the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft on August 3 and 4, 1978, appellants were
Each appellant was given two

found guilty as charged.

concurrent sentences of one to fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison to be served following completion of the
sentences they were currently serving.
~E~=EF

SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks affirmation of the convictions
and sentences o=

a~?ellants.
S'::-_ZI.TE~IENT

OF THE FACTS

On April 18, 1978, appellant Tucker was a prisoner
in the rininum

sec~rity

compound of the Utah State Prison.

He was serving an indeterminate sentence of one to fifteen
years for the crime of rape

(R.

at 189, State's Exhibit 2-5)

and had not been paroled or pardoned

(R. at 191, State's

Exhibit 3-5). Appellants Sharp and Christensen were also
confined in minimus security at the Prison following felony
convictio!ls and 90-day presentence evaluation commitments
(E. at 193, State's E}:hibits Ss and 6s ).

Zl,ll three '-''ere

clothed i!l denim trousers when they were given shovels and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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left with another inmate named Brooks along a ditch on
Prison property to carry out a work detail at about 1:00
p.m.

Appellant Tucker had on a blue shirt and headband.

Appellant Sharp had an orange shirt stuck in his pocket
and appellant Christensen had on an orange shirt (R. at
206-209).
At about 3:00 p.m., Prison Instructor Paul
Christensen, who was supervising the work detail, noticed
inmate Brooks walking alone toward the minimum security
area of the Prison (R. at 211).

Upon investigation, the

shovels which had been issued to appellants were discovered,
one lying at the end of the ditch, the other two where the
men had begun working (R. at 211) .
a~tempt

After an unsuccessful

to locate appellants, Mr. Christensen notified Prison

Control that an escape had occurred

(R. at 213).

A head

ccc.:nt was immediately conducted and it was discovered that
c?ccellants viere, indeed, missing (R. at 224, 225).
At about the same time, 3:00p.m. on April 18, 1978,
t~o

female employees of Riverton City were sitting in the

city offices and noticed three men walking together (R. at 230).
The men wore blue shirts and denim pants.
(?.

at 231-232).

One

wor~

a headband.

Riverton Police Chief, Leonard Smock,

also saw the men and noted that cne of them wore a turquoise
blue shirt.

He identified another as appellant Christensen

"'·at 285).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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29~!-

at
tsstifis~

~hat

apprehs~ded
turqucis~

Gfficer

~;hile

he

~as

appellant Sharp

~er_:n:..ty

searching
hidi~g

She~iff

~~e

under a

c·urtis

,

c:1e

:~ielson

D8~ntainsi~e

~e

t~ee.

shirt was found with hin (R. at 305-307).

~~ipple

noted

tha~

he took appellant

C~riste~sen

into custody as Christensen was trying to hide in the
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brush

(R. at 313).
Larry Debillo had been driving in the area with

his wife and had stopped at a roadblock conducted by prison
officers.

They gave him a flyer with a picture and descrip-

tion of appellant Tucker (R. at 255).

As Mr. Debillo was

driving toward Lark, Utah he saw appellant Tucker hitchhiking
and picked him up
(R. at 256).

(R. at 257-258).

Mr. Debillo was armed

After driving for a while, Mr. Debillo took

appellant Tucker into custody and sent his wife for the
sheriff

(R. at 259-261).
Appellant Tucker testified for the defense and

indicated that he had left the Prison work detail

(R. at 340)

and had met appellants Christensen and Sharp in Riverton.
He said he had been drinking

(R. at 344).

He claimed that

later as he and appellant Sharp were walking along the road,
appellant Christensen drove up in the white Cadillac.

Tucker

testified that he and Sharp joined Christensen in the car
and together they headed toward the Prison.
then decided to go for a ride.

However, they

When the police began the

chase Tucker did not ask the others to stop the car because
he did not want the police to catch him (R. at 346 and 347).
After deliberation,. the jury found appellant Tucker
9uilty of 7heft and Escape from official custody and appellants
Sharp and Christensen guilty of Theft and Aiding Escape {R.
atSponsored
l2:C byto
126).
the S.J.
Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS SHARP AND CHRISTENSEN lVERE
PROPERLY CONVICTED OF AIDING THE ESCAPE
OF APPELLANT TUCKER.
A

THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANTS
\VAS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE
ESCAPE/AIDING ESCAPE STATUTES.
Appellants Sharp and Christensen contend that their
conduct was not sufficient to constitute a violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 76-8-310
(1)
(2)

(1953), as amended, which provides:

A person is guilty of ~n offense if:
a) ~~ ~~ds another person to escape
from official custody:.
An offense under this section is a
felony of the second degree if~
b) ·"' person to \>'hom the aid .
. is
given is a prisoner confined in
the state prison.

Escape from Official Custody is proscribed by Utah Code Ann.
§

76-8-309

(1953), as amended, which provides:
(1)
(2)

A person is guilty of escape if he
escapes from official custody.
The offense is a felony of the second
degree if: .
b) The actor escapes from confinement
in the state prison.

Appellants urge a very narrow reading of these
statutes which Respondent submits is improper.

By urging

that an escape is complete as soon as an actor sets foot
off prison property and th2t any aid given thereafter cannot
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
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be aiding an escape, appellants argue that there was no
proof of the necessary acts or intent to constitute the
crime charged.

Nevertheless, a careful reading of the

cases cited by appellants reveals that appellants' interpretation of the Utah statutes is unduly restrictive and
that conviction in this matter is consistent with the law
of aiding escape throughout the country.
In Orth v. United States, 252 F. 566 (5th Cir.
1918), the defendant had been convicted on two counts.
Each count involved a seperate portion of a federal statute.
The first count charged that the defendant had aided an
escaped prisoner.

The facts indicated that the defendant

had allowed an escapee to hide in his home and then sent
him on his way.
be~ore

The escapee had been free for some days

the defendant rendered any aid.

The Court ruled

that conviction for aiding the escape was improper but
noted:
This conclusion does not effect
(sic) the conviction on the second
count charging that the defendant
harbored and concealed. (Id. at 568)
7he

de~endant's

sentence was affirmed.

Unlike the United States Code as applied in Orth,
the Utah Code does not contain a statute proscribing
t~e

act

o~

harborin~

cr aidinc an escaped prisoner.

Moreover,

of conduct undertaken by all appellants in this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,-may
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matter indicates an on-going act.
few hours appellants walked away

Within the space of a
fro~

car and attempted to elude the police.

the prison, took a
There was ample

evidence from which the jury could and did infer an ongoing attempt to elude authorities and complete an escape
Given the locale of the prison, it is clear

to freedom.

that no escapee can get far without some transportation.
Unlike Orth, where the escapee had been at large for
several days before the

de~endant

gave aid, appellants

Sharp and Christensen left the prison at or near the same
time as appellant Tucker and all three were actively
corroboratl~G

time

in a

therec:~ter.

at~emc~

to avoid police a very short

h';'1ile the narrow reading of "escape" was

appro:;nia te in Orth h'here the conduct of the defendant
remained criminal under another more applicable portion of
the same statute, in Utah there is no soeci!ic alternate
The lack of such a orovision indicates that the
escape and aiding escape statutes should be read broadly
enough to include help rendered during the entire attempt
by

~he

escapee to place himself beyond the reach of legal
Appellants Sharp and Christensen h'ere helping

Appellant Tucker avoid re-capture h'ithin an hour of h'hen
they

~ere

all discovered

~~ssina

fro~

the same

~ork

detail

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at the prison.

It would be unduly restrictive to rule

that aid given so soon after a departure from the prison
as part of such a clearly continuous course of events was
not aiding the escape of appellant Tucker.
Other authority cited by appellants supports a
more broad reading of the Utah statutes.

In State v. Jones,·

36 P.2d 530 (Idaho 1934), a prisoner was working outside
the jail under the supervision

of a deputy.

Although he

was supposed to be delivering coal, he went, instead, to the
house of a friend with whom he had left some money he had
stolen.

His friend, the defendant, gave him some money

and sent him on his way.

Although the court cited People v.

Quijada, 53 Cal.App 39, 199 P. 854
defi~ition

in

t~e

(1921) to state the narrow

of escape, the court held that the escapee was

lawful custody of the deputy when he was assisted

by the defendant

(36 P.2d at 531), even though he had clearly

gone where he was not authorized to go.

The defendant's

conviction for aiding escape was affirmed.

Just as in Jones,

the actions of appellants Sharp and Christensen in this matter
were rendered contemporaneously with Appellant Tucker's
escape anc made it possible for appellant Tucker
::o place himself comfortably beyond the ir.unediate reach of
authority.
State ex rel. Farrior v. Faulk, 136 So. 601 (Fla.,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1931), cited by appellants, did not involve an aiding escape
The escapee had left the jail and had gone into a

chargco.

neighboring county.

The sheriff of that county arrested

him and sought expenses and transportation costs from the
original county.

The court held that the escapee was an

escaped prisoner and that the sheriff was able to arrest and
was entitled to costs.

The ruling was clearly made in the

interests of orderly and efficient police work.

There was

absolutely no indication of how the court might have ruled
upon the question of when help given to an escapee may
properly be

ter~ed

as aiding the escape.

In People v. Quintero, 67 Mich. App.
2d 251

(1976),

an issue.

~~e

481, 241 N.W.

question of aiding escape was, again, not

It was not clear in that case whether the escapee-

defendant had been found off or on the prison ground.

The

court said that he "escapes if he removes himself from the
imposed restraint over his person and volition."

(Id. at 252).

The evidence in the instant matter indicates that appellants
1·1ere all trying to do just that-remove themselves from
restraint over their persons and volition.

They were disco1·ecc

missing at about 3:00 p.m. and were seen driving away in a
car not their own within the half hour.
separated, it was for a VEry short time.

If they were ever
_c, perfectly acceptat~

logical inference for the jury to have made was that all
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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appellants left the prison together.

In any event, in

light of the absence of a harboring statute in Utah the
narrow view that one may aid an escape only by acting
before or as the escapee leaves the narrowest physical
confines of his confinement would be unjust.

In this

case appellants acted in concert during or very shortly
after their departure from prison property to make good
their getaway.

The time interval was so short as to make

consecutive events of walking away, stealing the car,
and eluding police one continuous transaction.
B

THE NECESSARY INTENT ELEMENT
WAS SHOI\'N BY THE EVIDENCE.
Appellants contend that the necessary intent element
was not shown and that their conviction was therefore defec~ive.

Appellants correctly note that where a specific inteQt

is not provided for a crime, a culpable mental state is
required, Utah Code Ann.

§

76-2-102

(1953), as amended.

However, it is well established that criminal intent may
be in:erred and need not be shown by direct evidence.

See

State v. }linousis, 64 utah 206 at 211-212, 228 P. 574

(1924)

and State v. Kazda, 15 U.2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 at 488

(1964).

Appellants contend -that the intent element for
aidins escape must be the same as for escape under Utah Code
_:..r.r:.

§

76-2-202

(1953), as amended.

Even if they are correct,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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it Joes not follow from the evidence that the jury could
not have concluded that appellants Sharp and Christensen
did not intend to effectuate an escape when they acted as
In Luke v.

they did.

State, 49 Ala.

30

(1873)

the defendants

were charged with arson for burning a hole in the jail
floor.

The elements of arson required that the fire be

set for an illegal purpose.

The court found such purpose

in that the defendants were aiding each other to escape.
All three appellants here were confined in the Utah State
Prison.

They all did their best, both together and then,

later, apart, to evade re-capture.
in different

di~ections

Their tactic of running

after abandoning the car increased

the chances that one or more might get away from which

t~e

jury could infer an intent to aid each other in their
common act.

As in Luke, appellants acted in concert to

achieve an escape.
In State v. Navarro,

163 A.

103

(Maine, 1932), the

court noted that "aiding an escape is any overt act '-'>'hich is
intended to assist an attempted or completed departure of
a prisoner from lawful custody before he is discharged by
due process of law."

(Id. at 104).

The defendant had given

aid after hearing of the prisoner's de;:'c:rture.
the sake of argument,
testimony was correct,

E\-en if,

for

it is conceded that appellant Tucker's
(thc:t he net appellants Christensen
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and Sharp after leaving the Prison) , they clearly aided him
in his further attempt to evade authority.
together in evading re-capture.

All three acted

The intent to assist each

other, as noted above, is clearly inferrable from their
actions.
Finally, State v. Cooper, 113 N.J.Super 34, 272
A.2d 557 (1971), supports this conclusion.

In that case

the defendant started a jail riot during which two prisoners
escaped.

He was found guilty of aiding their escape.

The

court stated that it was not necessary to show actual participation in the escape or any intent to aid the escape.
The court said the defendant should have known that his
acts could create a possibility for escape and affirmed
the conviction.

The facts here are much stronger.

The acts

of appellants Sharp and Christensen clearly went to aiding
ap8ellant Tucker to make his esca8e complete.
Tucker
it

~as

~as,

like themselves,

inca~cerated

They knew

in the prison and

clearly inferrable that they knew and intended that

their actions would create a possibility for Tucker's escape.
Appellants contend further that there was no
evidence of a specific intent to aid appellant Tuc~er's
escape.
~e~e

They say that they, appellants Sharp and Christensen,

simply engaging in a Class B

~isdemeanor

escape when

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
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appellant Tucker happened along.

By so arguing, they

concede that escape is an on-going crime since, according
to appellant Tucker's testimony, he met his co-defendants
outside the prison.

But even more important is the fact

that from the moment the evidence puts the three together
in Riverton there was clearly a common intent and effort
to avoid re-capture.

They were hardly "clean away" when

they were on foot in Riverton in prison clothing.
were in a car,

ru~ning

They

away from the police within less than

an hour of when they were reported missing at the prison.
They were all

co~~l~~~ng

the same physical acts--the only

difference between the Class B Misdemeanor of appellants
Sharp and

Ch~is~e~se~

and the second degree felony of

appellant Tucker was the technical status of the men at
the prison.

Clearly the jury could have inferred an intent

to

co~mit

the crime of aiding the escape of appellant Tucker

on

beha~f

of appellants Sharp

a~d

Christensen.

This concl'-.Jsio:.

is supported by the holding of the court in State v. Stark,
490 P.2 511

(Or.App., 1971) cited by appellants at p.ll.

In that case the defendant and several of his friends had
picked up two hitchhikers.

The hitchhikers were robbed and

defendant contended ''that to find him guilty of the unarmed
robbery the jury should have been instructed that he
had to knowingly aid and abE:'':: Ronald Hansen."

(Stark)

The court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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held that the following instruction was proper:
It is sufficient if the defendant
William Gerald Stark . . . was or~sent
when the robbery was committed,-and
acquiesced therein, with a common
criminal intent or purpose.
All three appellants were escaping from authority.
They were doing it together and were acting in such a way
as to aid each other.

This was clearly shown by the evidence

and the verdicts were proper.

c
THE RULE OF STATE V. SHONDEL
IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE.
Appellants contend that under the case of State
v. Shondel, 22 U.2d 343, 453 P.2d 146
~ore

(1969) and this Court's

recent affirmations of the rule of that case, they were

in?rO?erly charged and sentenced.

Respondent respectfully

submits that appellants have misread Shondel.

In Shondel

and the cases which followed, State v. Fair,23 U.2d 34, 456
P.2d 168

(1969); Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977);

and State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575 (Utah 1978), the concern
was always with two statutes creating the same crime but
s~eci=ying

separate penalties.

In Shondel, possession of

LSD was prohibited in two statutes.

One statute made the

crime a misdemeanor and another made it a felony.

Similar

problems were posed in the subsequent cases cited above.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A fundamental difference between those cases and the matter
at hand is that the defendants in those cases could not
have been charged with or convicted of violating both statutes.
The court had to make a choice as to which statute to proceed
under.

In this case the supposedly conflicting statutes

proscribe escape and aiding escape.

In aiding appellant

Tucker's escape, appellants Sharp and Christensen committed
a second degree felony.

In effectuating their own escape,

appellants Sharp and Christensen committed a Class B Misdemeanor.
It is well-established that within one episode or continuous
course of conduct an actor may commit more than one crime,
Utah Code Ann.

§

~~-l-402

(1953), as amended.

Moreover, it

has been made clear by this Court that when two crimes are
committed, neither of which may be tried within the same
court, that they may be tried separately.
Cooley, 575 P.2d 693

See State v.

(Utah 1978) where the defendant had

committed three offenses within the same course of conduct.
Two of the offenses were Class B misdemeanors and one was
an indictable misdemeanor.

The Court held that separate

prosecutions in the District Court and the Justice Court
were proper.

Conviction of aiding the escape of appellant

Tucker did not preclude the state from further prosecution
of appellant's Sharp and Christensen for the crime of escape.
They could have properly been charged and convicted of both
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crimes.

The fact that one act creates two separate criminal

results does not prohibit the prosecution of both

crimes.

Under Shondel when achievement of the same criminal result
may result in differing penalties, the lesser penalty must
be imposed.

No such choice is mandated in this case.

Appellants were, therefore, properly charged and convicted.
Their verdicts and sentences should be affirmed.
POINT II
APPELLANTS WERE PROPERLY CONVICTED
OF THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE
AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
AN INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF TEMPORARILY DEPRIVING AN
Ol'INER OF A VEHICLE.
Appellants concede the establishment of all the
elements of the crime of theft of an operable motor vehicle
except for intent to permanently deprive (Appellants' Brief
a~

p. 18).

They contend that the evidence was ambiguous

on that element and that the trial court committed error
in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense
of joyriding, as they requested.

Respondent submits that

the evidence clearly indicated that the offense of appellants
was not joyriding and that they were guilty of the_ offense
of which they were convicted.
Utall Code Annotated § 76-6-404

(1953), as amended,

provides:
A person commits theft if he
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obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
utah Code Annotated

§

76-6-401 (3)

(1953), as amended provides

further:
Purpose to deprive means to have
the conscious object: To withhold property permanently or for so extended
a period or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of
its economic value, or of the use and
benefit thereof, would be lost;
In State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 at 218

(Utah 1976) this

Court held that:
The intent to steal or unlawfully
deprive •te rig~tful owners of their
proper~: c~~ be inferred by defendant's
conduct and the attendant circumstances
testi~~ed

to by the

~itnesses.

In State v. Gil:ci_an, 23 U.2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 at 812

(1970)

this Court quoted State v. Johnson, 112 Ll. 130, 185 P. 2d
738

(1947)

to say:
That the defendant is entitled to have
the jury instructed on his theorv cf the
case if there is anv substantial evidence
to justify givi:~g s~ch an i:1struction.
(Emphasis in original).

In State v.

Doughert~

550 P.2d 175 at 176-177

(Utah 1976)

this Court further noted that an instruction on a lesser
included offense may be refused ''if the prosecution has met
its burden of proof 0:1 the greater offense, and there is no
evider:ce tending to reduce the greater oC::"e:1se."
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The evidence in this matter clearly demonstrated
that appellants intent was to permanently deprive the owner
of her automobile.

Apoellants contend that because there

was no significant damage done to the vehicle and that the
vehicle was recovered only a short distance from the point
of taking within a relatively short time

tha~

the court

must necessarily have concluded that appellants only intended
to make temporary use of the vehicle.

While the facts noted

by appellants are in the record, they do not present a
complete picture of what transpired and should not be viewed
out of context.

The only reason the car was recovered

quickly with minimal damage was because police reacted almost
imrnediately to the theft.
a high-speed chase

The automobile was abandoned after

(R. at 294).

The fact of temporary

possession does not and should not be taken to indicate an
intent to possess temporarily.

On the contrary, the fact

that appellants were escaped prisoners trying to elude recapture indicated clearly that they had no intention of
returning the car to its owner after a short drive in the
neighborhood.

Appellant Tucker's testimony that they were

only trying to return to prison with the car is totally
inconsistant with all the other evidence.

If they were

returning to custody, why did they flee from the police both
in the car and then, later, on foot?

Moreover, even if
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Tucker's testimony were believable, there was no indication
that appellants would have done anything to see that the
owner of the automobile would have recovered the vehicle
within a short period of time, if ever.
instructi~

Several cases from other jurisdictions are
In People v. Hutchins, 20 Cal Rptr.

on this point.

497

(Cal. App., 1962) the defendant was charged with grand theft
of an automobile.

He had

~ented

a car from a Hertz outlet

in Long Beach but had not returned the car on the agreed date.
The car was, in fact, left abandoned on or near another
Hertz lot at tte

~os

kngeles airport.

The court held that

the evidence was sufficient tc prove that the defendant took
t~e

ca~

~it~

t~e

i~tent

to de?rive the cwner of title to

a~d

possession of tte vehicle.
In Robinso:c v. Commom:ealth, 190 \'a. 134, 56 S.E.22.
367

(19~9)

a~~

took a

the de:':endant and others broke into a car cealershi:
ne~

Fo=d automobile.

The car was found several

The defendant was convicted cf theft and

contende~

en appeal that he was guilty of unauthorized use, not theft.
The court held:
In the case at bar the conduct
of the defendant negatives any idea
that he intended to deprive the owner
of the car tempora~ily.
Ee did no act
prio~

he

to

~is

arrest tc ~ndicate t~at
to ~eturn the car to the
On the o~her ~and, his con6uct

inte~~e6

o~ner.
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and testimony disclose that he intended
to deprive the owner of the car permanently.
This is the only conclusion
that can be reached from the evidence.
The circumstances under which the car
was taken, and his actions regarding
it afterwards, including his abandoning
it in a public highway, show clearly
that he was guilty of the offense of
larceny and not of unauthorized use.
We do not think that the instruction
offered was proper, and the court did
not commit error in refusing it.
Id. at 372.
So also the facts in this case would not have
justified an instruction on the lesser included offense of
joyriding.
~ad

Appellants did nothing to indicate that they

any intent other than to permanently deprive the owner
They ran away

CJf possession.
the

auto~obile.

~a.:1ner.

fro~

should

They abandoned

They drove the car in a dangerously reckless

(R. at 290,294, 308,312).

~poellants

the police.

~ot

be~efit

fro~

They were escaped

priso~ers.

the quick and efficient

ac-tion of the Ri\:erton Police in that an offense othenvise
a felony is reduced to a rrisdemeanor because they were quickly
apprehended.
Appellant relies upon State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d 360
(Ctah 1977).
:~ere

~n

Eowever, that case is

the Court held that the

jur~

disti~guishabl~

in that

was properly instructed

both the greater and lesser offenses because the evidence
intent was clearly in coubt.

The defendant had oresented
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evidence which tended to negate an intent to permantly
In this case the only possible evidence of such

deprive.

a nature was the un-supported, incredible assertions of
appellant Tucker that the car had been taken to return to
prison.

Even that testimony does not indicate any intent to

return the automobile to the owner, at best, it simply indica tee
that the appellants may not have intended to travel a long
distance.

The car was recovered and returned quickly but not

through the actions of ap?ellants.
In summary, an instruction on the lesser-included
offense of joyriding was not justified in this case since no
reasonable

Vl2w

of the eviaence would have supported a convict::

of such an offense.

Moreover, the intent of appellants to

permantly decrive the owner of the stolen automobile was
clearlv and properly inferrable from tte evidence.

The

convictions were proper and should be affirmed.
POHT III
SINCE EACH APPELLANT RECEIVED TWO
EQUAL CONCURRECIT SEl'ITEl\CES, AN HiPROPER CONVICTION ON ONE SENTENCE
IS HARMLESS ERROR.
Utah Code Ann.

§'76-3-401(7)

(1953)

as amended provides

that whenever two equel, concurrent sentences are imposed,
"they shall merge into one sentence."
all appellants received

t~o

In the instant

~atter,

equal, concurrent sentences.
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The

practical effect is that each appellant has received one
sentence on two alternate theories of conviction.
Appellant Tucker does not challenge his conviction
of escape in this appeal.

Hence, even if the Court finds

that the conviction for theft of an automobile was defective,
appellant Tucker's sentence should stand unchanged.
Appellants Sharp and Christensen were convicted of
both aiding the escape of Tucker and of theft of an automobile.
In order for their sentences to be altered, this Court must
find that both of their convictions were defective.

If the

court finds that only one conviction is defective, their
sentences should also remain unchanged.
circu~stance

This is the same

which faced the court in Orth v. United States,

supra, wherein the defendant had been convicted upon two
counts, one of which was held improper.

The defendant's

sentence was left unaltered since conviction on the proper
count alone produced the penalty.
To capsulize, a finding by this Court that the
theft convictions were improper, by itself, would indicate
harmless error since the convictions of escape and aiding
escape would remain unchanged and the sentences of appellants
would remain the same.

Moreover, a finding that the aiding

escape convictions alone were
same result.

de~ective

would produce the

Unless this Court £inds for appellants on all
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a~y

issues raised in this appeal,
error since the sentences

~f

In any event, any finding of

error noted is harnless

a;pellants
t~is

~o~ld

not be altered.

Court on the issues raised

on betalf of appellant Tucker can have no bearing upon his
conviction and sentence since he does not challenge his
conviction of escape.
Tucker is, therefore,

Any error with respect to appellant
har~less.
CC:~CLCSIC~\

Appellants Sharp and Christensen
charged

~ith

indica~es

a:-1C.

~~a~

~ehicle

evidence
the

and convicted of aiding the escape of appellant

~~e

c::-.~istense!1

~otor

co~rt

properly

~ere

~ould

actio~s

of

~~pella~ts

also cCD.Y.ti.. ~ted

and

~ot

L~e

joyridi~~.

Starp

a~d

C~=is~e~se~

c::::.- i~e c: escape does

~o

:-:ct

reasonable view of the

have supported a conviction of joyriding and

pro?erl~-

re~use~

a~

::-:str~c~io:-:

o~

t~e

lesser
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=~~~e.

on

so~e

but not all of the issues raised in this appeal,

the error must be considered harmless since the convictions
and sentences of appellants Sharp and Christensen remain
essentially unchanged unless they prevail on all issues
raised.

In any event, appellant Tucker has not challenged

his escape conviction and a finding that his conviction for
automobile theft

~as

defective would not alter his sentence

and should be regarded as harmless.
The convictions and sentences of appellants should
be sustained as proper.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBER?

o.

EA~L

?.

R~~SE~

General

Attor~ey

DORICS
Attorney General

Assis~ant
Attor~eys

for Respondent
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